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As is well known, there is a global trend toward vertical disintegration in manufacturing.  
Large manufacturing firms, across a broad array of industrial sectors, are radically reducing 
the amount of their product that they both produce and design themselves. Instead they are 
turning to suppliers for key design, component, and even system in-puts.  This shift has 
created a great deal of business for specialized suppliers in a vast array of areas throughout 
the global manufacturing economy.  But it has also created an entirely new and challenging –
often quite contradictory—terrain of relations between suppliers and their customers.  Our 
claim in this chapter is that relations between suppliers and customers in manufacturing are 
becoming systematically more heterogeneous within all advanced industrial societies.  
Further, this global trend is exacerbated by the diversity of institutional architectures and 
production practices in different political economies.  In making this argument, we show that 
neither neoliberal nor particular forms of  institutionalist arguments (in particular the Varieties 
of Capitalism perspective) adequately capture  current global dynamics in manufacturing. 
 
The chapter is in three sections.  The first describes the changing dynamics between suppliers 
and customers in contemporary manufacturing in the advanced industrial countries.  The 
second section then constructs a typology of the range of supplier-customer relationships that 
seem to be emerging in the contemporary global manufacturing environment.  The third 
section then moves to a discussion of the way in which these relationships are being realized 
in different national market contexts, in particular the United States and Germany.1
 
 
1.: Changing dynamics between suppliers and customers in manufacturing: 
 
For over a decade now, the literatures on the automobile and electronics industries have been 
preoccupied with the process of vertical disintegration in production.2 Recently, observers of 
lower volume sectors of manufacturing, such as the production of agricultural equipment, 
construction machinery and other forms of industrial machinery have also been describing 
this phenomenon.3
 
  The contemporary logic of vertical disintegration is the following.  Due to 
intensifying global competition, rapid technological change, shortening product life cycles, 
and greatly variegated consumer demand for product customization, the spatial, financial, 
manpower and organizational resources of firms become overtaxed and cannot respond 
efficiently.   In order to save time and resources, diversify exposure to risk and enhance 
flexibility, OEMs concentrate their activities on so-called “core competence” areas—i.e.: on 
particular functions, such as marketing or overall styling and product design, and/or on 
particular aspects of the manufacturing process in which they for one reason or another hold a 
competitive advantage or have valuable, difficult to replicate, expertise.  In all other areas 
outside core competences, OEMs rely on suppliers to contribute essential components, 
systems and aspects of product development. 
This change in the purchasing strategies of OEM firms has not simply increased the amount 
of business available to component suppliers and other specialists. Rather, it has also 
dramatically changed the kinds of demands that OEMs place on them.  Suppliers are now 
expected to 
  
• provide their customers with significant know how (in the form of product design 
and/or manufacturing expertise),  
• produce at extraordinarily high levels of quality (fewer than 100 defective parts per 
million is increasingly standard),  
• provide a variety of services for the customer (in the shape of logistics and sub 
assembly) 
• all while continuously reducing the cost at which they provide these things.   
 
Moreover,  it is also increasingly rare that customers simply trust that their suppliers are doing 
these things.   Even long time customers are now subjecting their traditional suppliers to 
constant benchmarking procedures, which place their performance in comparison to “best 
practice” in their market.  Importantly, this is not simply a disciplining tactic on the part of 
newly dependent OEM’s to protect against potential supplier opportunism (though it can have 
that effect).  Rather, even in cases where there is extensive collaboration and mutual 
dependence between customer and supplier, constant benchmarking and comparison of 
supplier performance and capabilities stems from the OEM’s urgent need for information 
about new developments in technology and manufacturing practice.  Because they are 
increasingly dependent on outside knowledge of these things, and because their future 
technological and manufacturing needs are uncertain and always subject to change, the 
process of surveying suppliers has become a crucial mechanism for learning for the customer 
firm. 4
 
 
In the same direction, with a slightly different accent:  When OEMs are increasingly 
dependent on the capabilities of their supply base, it becomes crucial for them to be vigilant in 
surveying the ways in which this external pool of capabilities is changing.  It is not simply a 
matter of determining , in the narrow sense of “benchmarking”,  how much better one 
supplier is at doing something than another.  Instead, OEMs seek to systematically survey the 
supply base in order to determine, in general, what can be expected or gained from available 
pools of expertise. 
 
As a result of all of this surveying, benchmarking and comparison on the part of OEM’s, 
suppliers, as we shall see below, must learn to live with the paradoxical reality of customers 
becoming both more reliant on them for know how and manufacturing input, while they 
simultaneously become more demanding and actively survey (and contract with) the suppliers 
competitors for newer, better and lower cost alternatives. 
 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that even though the trends  toward vertical 
disintegration just described are unmistakable, the practices of OEM’s in manufacturing are 
far from uniform.  There are at least three significant aspects of the situation in which OEM’s 
find themselves that produce broad heterogeneity in their practices in production and in 
relationship to suppliers.5
 
   
First, many OEMs are very large multinational corporations with far flung operations 
involving multiple plants and production facilities in many locations. Moreover, such firms 
produce a broad and wide array of products and models across those far flung plants.  
Companies of this scale and complexity do not vertically disintegrate massively, all at once, 
and in toto.  Instead, they seek to do it piecemeal in locations where it is very easy to do, or 
where it is most urgently needed --or they introduce new models as “experiments” with 
disintegrated production in locations where there will be no entrenched in house opposition.  
In other production locations, or with respect to a particular product model, where internal 
resistance to disintegration is great or where in house production continues to be profitable, 
vertical disintegration does not occur.   
 
This reality creates great complexity in customer supplier relations because neither internal 
engineers and purchasers nor outside suppliers are ever completely sure what the internal 
capacities of the OEM are. For example, certain plants of a large Automobile producer may 
abandon stamping, while one or two others maintain it because they have productive 
machinery that is not yet amortized or that is running at full capacity due to the success of a 
particular product model.  In such a situation, an outside stamping supplier may find that it is 
drawn into intimate design and product development discussions on one project and yet is 
then completely shut out of discussions on another with the same customer because the latter 
development team regards stamping as a core competence! The same customer is not always 
the same customer. 
 
Second, even in cases where it is clear that an OEM does not view a particular aspect of 
production as a long term core competence or as possessing special competitive advantage for 
the firm, it may nonetheless retain some internal production capacity in that area simply to 
retain some in house know how and enhance its ability to engage in knowledgeable 
collaboration with (and evaluation of) outside suppliers. In house production facilities can be 
made to bid on projects against outsiders to facilitate this.  In some cases the supplier  could 
win the bid and be brought intimately into the development process of a model, while in other 
cases the in house unit is the victor.  This kind of competition between in house and external 
suppliers can exist for extended periods of time, with the outcomes continuously changing 
and unpredictable. 
 
Thirdly,  heterogeneity in practice with respect to suppliers arises out of the sheer complexity 
of the contracting that vertical disintegration in production produces for any given model or 
product—and the content of heterogeneity changes over time.  OEM’s seek to gain cost 
savings and know how from their suppliers.6
 
  But it is not necessarily true that the OEM seeks 
to maximize both of those goals in every contract with every supplier every time.  For 
example, a buyer for an OEM may need to achieve certain aggregate cost reduction targets on 
a particular model and she can achieve those targets by using leverage with one or two 
suppliers (or helping them achieve leverage) or by bidding out a relatively standard or mature 
component or sub-assembly that had been designed and until then produced by a particular 
specialized supplier.   
This move to push a supplier further away, however, can be undertaken  to create space for 
OEM engineers to engage in a valuable but relatively expensive collaboration with another 
supplier of a different component or sub-assembly for the same product.  Thus, the same 
OEM on the same product model may be engaging in a variety of different sorts of relations 
with suppliers simultaneously.  And, as the product is redesigned, OEM behavior toward 
suppliers may change—those pushed away may be offered greater intimacy (and better 
margins), while the intimate partners of the past suddenly find themselves having to bid on 
their own designs against competitors.  As we will see, suppliers learn to participate in this 
kind of waltz with their customers, often agreeing  to (or offering) a cost reduction that ruins 
the margin of profit on one contract in exchange for  future business with the customer, at a 
better rate.   
 
All of these examples are intended to show that  although the evidence is incontrovertible that 
there is a secular trend toward vertical disintegration in manufacturing across industries world 
wide, this has in no way produced uniformity in the practices of OEMs across industries, 
within industries or even within single firms and plants.  There are multiple and changing 
strategic calculations in play.  In the following sections, we will attempt to outline the range 
of relationships that seem to be emerging and the differing contributions of national context in 
their emergence and governance. 
 
 
 
2.: Typology of emerging OEM-supplier relations 
 
All of this change in the kinds of demands that are being placed on suppliers as well as the 
variety of practices that OEM’s pursue has given rise to a great deal of turbulence in the way 
in which relationships between OEM’s and suppliers are constituted.  We suggest that vertical 
disintegration can produce (at least) five ideal typical forms of Customer – Supplier relations 
in manufacturing:  1.) Arms Length/Spot Market relation; 2.) Autocratic or Captive Supplier 
relation; 3.) Contract Manufacturing; 4.)  Collaborative Manufacturing; and 5.) Sustained 
Contingent Collaboration.  The first four types derive from our reading of the most prominent 
types of relations described in the contemporary literature on supply chains and vertical 
disintegration.  The fifth type is our own.   Our claim is that the environment is such that it is 
possible to find each of these relationships in practice today, but that types 3, 4 and 5  are the 
most historically distinctive, and type 5 in particular seems to be rapidly emerging as the most 
stable and modal relation.  
 
Type 1:  Arms Length/Spot Market Relation: For a core part of the twentieth century in 
many of the most developed industrial economies, vertical integration was a dominant 
strategy in manufacturing across many sectors.  In this context, the typical supplier 
relationship was an arms-length one in which the price mechanism in the market governed the 
logic of exchange.  In this kind of relationship, suppliers either constructed complex parts 
according to designs made by the OEM, or they sold commodity or standardized products to 
the OEM.  In both cases, the relationship was characterized by a strict division between 
product development and production and  by a strong emphasis on price.  Contracts went to 
the lowest bidder. 
 
These relationships continue to exist in the current environment of increasing vertical 
disintegration, though now they exist as one of several different kinds of ties between 
suppliers and customers, and tend to appear under relatively specific and quite constrained 
conditions.  In all cases of spot market sub-contracting, the competences between customer 
and supplier are very clearly defined and the contours of the desired component are very 
precisely specified.  In particular, no customized design input from the supplier is needed. 
There is neither ambiguity nor competition between customer and supplier on their respective 
roles in the process of developing and producing the customer’s product. 
 
Under these conditions, there are two ways in which arms length relationships come into 
being.  First, normed or standard parts, typically purchased in high volume, are classic 
components in which price is the central determinant of the exchange.  In such cases, the 
contours of the product are well known so that product designers can build the components 
into their own designs and suppliers make no design contribution to the customer’s product.  
Further, the manufacture of the component does not belong to the designated manufacturing 
core competences of the customer firm, so that the outside supplier does not compete with in 
house production units.  The second manner in which arms length contracting emerges is in 
the classic case of  “capacity subcontracting” or “verlängerte Werkbank” subcontracting.7
 
  
Here the component part is well defined by the customer, no design input is needed from the 
supplier, but the manufacture of the component counts as a core competence of the customer 
firm.  Under such conditions, arms length contracting takes place when in house operations at 
the customer run into capacity bottlenecks.  Firms then solicit bids from supplier firms on 
their own in house component blue prints.  The lowest bidder gets the work. 
This is not an historically novel relationship nor is it an especially problematic one for either 
customer or supplier.   There is no loyalty, no informal trust, no obligation between the parties 
beyond that specified in the contract.  In a sense there is no history in the relationship—
gaining repeated contracts with a customer is an indication of a supplier firm’s efficiency and 
does not in any way lessen the likelihood that the customer will turn to an alternative supplier 
with a lower price in a subsequent round of contracting. At the margin, components that can 
be produced within this kind of relationship have a great potential to migrate to low cost 
production locations.  But there are also many countervailing trends such that one still finds 
significant amounts of this kind of contracting taking place among customers and suppliers in 
high wage regions. 
 
Type 2: Autocratic or Captive Supplier Relations:  This kind of relationship exists in only 
very specific contexts, most quintessentially within Japanese Keiretsu networks.  Here the 
competences in design and production of the supplier and customer are complementary, but 
the relationship is extremely hierarchical.  The supplier is typically utterly dependent on a 
single customer, and follows the lead of the customer in design and production.  The contours 
of the product can be uncertain at the beginning of the relationship, but the solution to design 
and manufacture problems follow the lead of the customer and there is no ambiguity on the 
distribution of returns. In the Japanese case, such relationships are possible because suppliers 
are integrated in a larger Keiretsu network which structures the flow of resources among a 
large end assembler and its suppliers (finance, technology, skilled labor, etc). Cooperation and 
flexibility among the players within this context is high and improves over time as the 
constancy of the tie (neither supplier nor OEM have alternatives) allows for learning and 
continuous improvement in the joint undertaking.  Moreover, the moral hazard risks typically 
associated with bilateral  mutual dependence are significantly mitigated due to mutual 
embedding of the supplier and customer in the keiretsu network.8
 
 
In many ways, these relationships resemble vertically integrated relations, and as a 
consequence it is not surprising that they seem to be under significant stress in the 
contemporary environment.9
 
  One very important limitation in the captive relation is that its 
practical business ties to specialists and bearers of know how outside the keiretsu, much less 
outside the industry, is limited. While learning occurs through the process of joint problem 
solving among the dependent parties, neither party aggressively or systematically  either 
cultivates or seeks analogous relations with competing specialists or customers in order to 
survey the terrain of technology and practice. 
Type 3: Contract Manufacturing: The distinctive feature of the customer-supplier relation 
here is a clear and unambiguous separation between processes of product design and product 
manufacture.  OEM’s do the design (and also marketing and distribution) and award 
production contracts to sophisticated suppliers who conduct and coordinate all of the 
production and assembly of the item.  There is virtually no supplier input into the design of a 
product, but there can be interaction and negotiation between supplier and customer in the 
process of applying designs to manufacturing processes. Customers undertake no production. 
  
As such, there is a strong mutual dependence between customer and supplier within this type 
and relationships can be long term and grow stronger over time.  On the whole, this clean 
separation is made possible by a far reaching standardization and modularization in the base 
technology of the sector.  Products are composed out of modules with distinctive content, 
interlinked by standard interfaces.  Indeed, nearly all of the hardware components 
manufactured by suppliers is in some way standardized—volumes are very high and supplier 
competitiveness hinges strongly on its capacity to achieve leverage.  The quintessential realm 
for contract manufacture in the contemporary manufacturing environment is product level 
electronics (computers, consumer electronics etc). 10
 
 
The relationship between OEM and supplier in this relation is very close, but limited.  In 
some ways, the limitation allows for the deepening of the relationship over time. Because 
suppliers have no ambition to design and customers have no ambition to produce, both have 
an incentive to work together to exploit one another’s strengths.  History strengthens the tie 
and improves the character and efficiency of limited collaboration.   Because the roles and 
boundaries between customer and supplier are in this way so clear, contract manufacturing 
relations, at least as an ideal type, are less plagued by the kinds of heterogeneous OEM 
sourcing strategies and behaviors described in section one.  OEM’s  are never competitors of 
their suppliers.  
 
This is not to say that such pressures for heterogeneity do not exist—indeed, they could even 
be intensifying.  Unpredictability and instability in this relationship is introduced by two 
factors:  The desire on the part of OEM’s to avoid capture by powerful contract suppliers and 
the need on the part of both parties to seek alternative customers and suppliers as a way to 
survey the relevant terrain in their sector for emergent technological and organizational 
possibilities.  Both of these factors push OEM’s to limit their commitments to a single 
supplier or even to a stable pool of suppliers in the interest of gaining technological and cost 
reduction leverage.   For their part, contract suppliers search the terrain for additional 
technological and organizational possibilities as well, causing them (opportunity cost) to 
bound their commitments even to their most trusted and reliable customers.  
 
In the long run, this search process is not only valuable to the individual development of 
customer and suppliers; it can also strengthen the on going relationship between the parties 
because what each learns from its relations with others allows them to contribute more 
creatively to mutual projects.  In the short run, however, such mutual searching creates 
difficulties as finite quantities of work have to be parceled between traditional and new 
suppliers(customers). Compromises and concessions on all sides must be made and this can 
produce considerable heterogeneity in the quality of relationships.  For example, customers 
may give existing suppliers less lucrative work, while it expands production with another 
contractor in a more attractive area—with a promise that in another product round the old 
supplier will be back in the cue for the high margin business.  Such suppliers accept the 
business to preserve the long term relation, but at the same time seek to compensate for the 
lost business by expanding its business with other OEM’s.   
 
Such creeping heterogeneity in the character and quality of relations destabilizes, or at least 
complicates, the contract manufacturing type and pushes it in the direction of what we will 
call “sustained contingent collaboration” below.  It deserves to be its own type, though, due to 
the strict division of labor between customer and supplier. The role boundary between 
development and production is never crossed. 
 
Type 4:  Collaborative Manufacturing. This is the limit case in the global trend toward 
vertical disintegration.   The relationship differs from the captive supplier relationship in that 
there is near parity in the power balance between customer and supplier: Each depends on the 
other for the definition and production of the desired part, and both bring know how to the 
relationship that neither could nor would be interested in acquiring on its own.  Thus, 
competences are fully complementary and leverage is counterbalancing.  Collaborative 
manufacturing also differs from the contract manufacturing relationship in that the 
competence and capacities of both parties are jointly indispensable not only for the production 
of a desired component, but for its design and development as well.  In this limiting case, 
collaboration begins as a joint exploration of the possibilities for the definition of a product 
between customer and supplier; neither party has a clear idea ex ante what the precise 
contours of the final product of the collaboration will be nor of its specific articulation or 
interface with the overall design of the end product.  But both parties recognize that they 
require the competences of the other and their collaboration defines the content of both design 
and production.  As a result, the collaborating parties view the outcome of their collaboration 
as a joint product from which equal rents should be drawn.11
 
  
As a type of relation between customer and supplier, collaborative manufacturing is defined 
by the systematic integration of development and manufacture between the parties.  Both 
bring competence in both to the joint project.  This distinctive characteristic of the relation, 
however, is also what makes collaborative manufacturing a limiting case in the typology.  
While it is possible to imagine stable collaborative manufacturing for the life of a particular 
joint product, it is extremely difficult to identify conditions under which relations between 
customers and suppliers could be characterized by full integration of production and 
development capability over multiple contracts over time.  In part, the explanation for this is 
the same one that contributed to greater heterogeneity within the contract manufacturing 
relation: The need to enlarge the pool of ties in search of new possibilities is in tension with 
the reality of a finite amount of work and capacity at any given time.  Through their efforts to 
learn, in other words, customers and producers are forced into trade offs and compromises in 
an effort to preserve old ties while developing new ones.   
 
Unlike the case of contract manufacturing, however, where the distinctiveness of the type is 
preserved despite increasing heterogeneity because the type-defining role division between 
design and production is never breeched, it is extremely difficult for collaborative 
manufacturing as a type to maintain integrity of its defining feature over time in the context of 
the search process.  Trade offs and compromises invariably lead to the separation of 
development and manufacture between customer and supplier.  Customers vary the quality of 
the contracts they establish with a single customer, some involving full blown collaboration, 
others involving only manufacture or more limited collaboration on design, in order to expand 
the number of potential suppliers it has available for collaboration.  As such, over time and 
multiple contracts, collaborative manufacturing as a type has a very strong tendency to 
degenerate into our fifth and final type, sustained contingent collaboration. 
 
 
Type 5: Sustained Contingent Collaboration.  If the collaborative relation is the limit case 
in the current environment, sustained contingent collaboration is the modal one.12
  
   This 
relationship can only be understood as a tie that exists between customer and supplier over 
time.  It emerges under conditions where both customer and supplier have important 
capabilities in both design and production.  This makes role definition a central point of 
negotiation between the contracting parties.  As we saw above, collaboration is one limiting—
and reproducible—moment within a sustained contingent collaboration.  But the definition of 
roles turns out to be much more heterogeneous within a relationship of sustained contingent 
collaboration due to two factors (both already mentioned) in the current global competitive 
environment: 
1.) the tendency of both customers and suppliers in the process of searching their 
environments for new technological organizational capacities to vary the quality 
and character of their relations with even their most valued partners in the interest 
of expanding the size of their pool of ties/partners; 
 
   
2.) the fact that the volatile, complex and non-simultaneous character of product 
change in the current environment leads OEM firms to separate their aggregate 
goals for the outside acquisition of know how and cost reduction from the 
particular relationship that they establish with individual suppliers. 
 
The mutual desire for access to outside capability results in variation in the intensity of the tie 
between customer and supplier over time and across projects.  Because both customer and 
supplier have both development and manufacturing capabilities, the parties can negotiate on 
the definition of the roles they will play in each contract round.  A customer and supplier 
involved in intense and intimate collaboration on one project may opt for a more limited 
relation (perhaps the supplier manufactures a component according to someone else’s 
designs) for a different project on a different product.  The variation allows each party to seek 
rewarding ties to others without exhausting their own capacities and while also avoiding the 
possibility that their relations will be entirely severed once the older very intimately 
collaborative project runs out.  The more flexibly partners can vary the roles they play, the 
greater is their capacity to search their environment for innovation and the more enduring can 
their relations with any particular partner be over time. 
 
Thus, the first factor above explains how a relationship between a single customer and 
supplier that is variously constituted over time can nonetheless be thought of as a sustained 
collaboration.  The second factor helps to elaborate how such collaboration can also be 
contingent. OEM’s maximize the know how gains and cost reduction contributions they 
receive from suppliers at an aggregate level, rather than at the level of each individual 
supplier relation, because it  gives them more flexibility. In many cases, they  attempt to 
realize both cost reductions and know how gains in the same relationship through 
collaboration with the supplier.  But in other cases, circumstances may be such that the OEM 
would like to lure an attractive specialist into its pool of  suppliers, so it will be willing to pay 
a premium for that specialist’s know how.  In order to meet aggregate cost targets for the 
whole product, however, such a move will have to be compensated by significant cost 
reductions from other suppliers in the pool.  The OEM can use its market power, leverage or 
very frequently the promise of  more lucrative work in a subsequent round to extract extra 
cost concessions from suppliers. 
 
This kind of multiple goal contracting with suppliers engenders significant role ambiguity and 
hence contingency and even conflict in the character of relations between suppliers and 
customers.  Suppliers are never sure what role they will play, or even are playing, at any 
moment in time—will they be courted for their know how, integrated into a collaborative 
process of combined development and cost reduction, or will they simply be pressed for cost 
concessions on components that were once understood to be one of the previous two 
categories? OEM’s foster this ambiguity because it is in their interest to have a supply base 
with broad capacities.  Good suppliers should have both technological know how and a 
skilled understanding of how cost can be eliminated from their role in the supply chain. 
Suppliers, naturally,  resent providing cost reductions because it threatens their margins. 
Hence, they continually resist OEM pressures by attempting to define their role as a know 
how providing, premium deserving, collaborator.  It is in the OEM’s interest to allow the 
supplier to succeed sometimes in their counter arguments regarding their role (otherwise they 
risk losing the supplier and its know how).  It is also in the supplier’s interest to develop the 
skill of being able to supply cost reduction when demanded without such reductions 
irreparably damaging the supplier’s margins.  If it cannot do this, the OEM is likely to regard 
the supplier as unskilled and too costly to keep within the pool of suppliers.  Strategic interest 
in the present and concern for future business make customer supplier relations into a 
sustained contingent collaboration. 
 
Strictly speaking, the logic of the first factor causing heterogeneity in customer-supplier 
relations is distinct from that of the second.  The search for know how in a world of finite 
contracts is different than endemic conflict over role definition.  In practice, however, the two 
logics blend into one another and produce powerful systematic pressures for the production 
and reproduction of heterogeneity in customer-supplier relations.    
 
This is especially obvious in the case of cost reduction. Supplier firms have an incentive to 
seek contracts with a range of customers so that they have access to new forms of both 
technological and organizational know how. This increases their competence and enhances 
their case vis a vis a particular customer that they be defined as a premium supplier of know 
how.  But since all customers seek both know how and cost reduction in equal measure (and 
in similarly flexible ways), suppliers find that they must have the ability to produce cost 
reductions wherever they go.  Skill at providing give backs without sacrificing either margins 
or production quality, it turns out, is just as attractive to customers as is special technological 
know how. The more experience one accumulates through multiple contracts with multiple 
customers, the better one becomes at being able to accommodate customer demands—and in 
being able to bargain with the customer about the role that the supplier firm should be 
playing.  But then, the more adroit a supplier becomes at adopting multiple roles with a 
customer, the more the customer will exploit this flexibility on the part of suppliers. All of 
this has a tendency to systematically reproduce broad heterogeneity in the quality and 
character of customer-supplier relations in the contemporary context of vertical disintegration 
in manufacturing. 
 
 
 
3.) Vertical disintegration in national context. 
 
Heterogeneity of relations in the context of secular vertical disintegration is a global trend.  It 
is occurring in all national manufacturing contexts.  Indeed, the uniqueness of the current 
period is that “best practice” in manufacturing has been nearly entirely decoupled from the 
particular institutional characteristics of national political economies.  Unlike the practice of 
much of the 1990s when firms looked to producers in the US, or twenty years ago when they 
looked to Japan, or a hundred years ago when they looked to Britain, today technological 
sophistication and organizational innovation (and pressure to change) is broadly distributed 
across the major developed regions of the world.  In the process of  “chunking” a new product 
down into its many sub systems, components and production processes, product development 
actors, manufacturing teams and purchasing managers in both OEMs and suppliers look 
“beneath” national models, so to speak, to particular mechanisms, techniques, forms of 
organization and design developed by their competitors that could enable them to improve 
their own practices and achieve their goals.  In this way, global trends work their way into all 
national systems in a self conscious but very local, and piecemeal fashion.  Moreover, since 
the process of benchmarking is continuous, no one can rest on their laurels and hence no 
national system is spared pressure to change at some level.  
 
In this section, we will argue that in the context of the global trend toward vertical 
disintegration and decentralized best practice, producers in both Germany and the US are 
struggling to construct and govern the array of relations we have outlined in the previous 
section.  In particular, we will focus on efforts to construct our modal type: sustained 
contingent collaboration.  The claim is that sustained contingent collaboration is emerging as 
the norm in both Germany and the US.  But the difficulties that firms encounter in 
constructing and governing these relations, while overlapping, are not identical in each 
country.  The institutional and experiential resource base (habitus),  for producers is different 
so the distribution of possibilities, strengths and weaknesses in capabilities and competences, 
is different.13  Sustained contingent collaborations are prevalent in both the German and the 
US political economies, yet they are entwined and enacted quite differently in both societies.   
 
In this sense, we agree with the institutionalist claim, against neo-liberalism, that there is 
variety or diversity in the forms of capitalism in the contemporary world.14
 
  Nonetheless, it is 
important to see that our argument departs quite substantially from the claims of a central 
school of contemporary institutionalism, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach 
pioneered by Peter Hall and David Soskice and their colleagues and collaborators, in two 
ways.   
First, we reject the strong Hall and Soskice argument that societies are endowed with 
comparative institutional advantages.15  For Hall and Soskice, successful German OEM 
manufacturers, because they are embedded in the institutional architecture of a “coordinated 
market economy” (cooperative labor relations, corporate governance with labor participation, 
patient capital, regulatory law),  are most likely to construct cooperative (non-market) 
relations with both labor and their suppliers and  pursue competitive market strategies that are 
characterized by product quality and incremental innovation.  By contrast, because US OEM 
producers are embedded in the institutional architecture of a “liberal market economy” 
(conflictual labor relations, capital dominated corporate governance, a financial system 
concerned only with profitable return and strict contract law), their labor and supply chain 
relations will be distant and arms length, characterized by conflict, wage and price pressure, 
all of which diverts producer attention from gradual improvements and incremental 
innovation.16
 
    
As the next section (3.1) will report, however,  this is not what the available evidence shows 
regarding supplier relations.   Producers in  both the US and Germany are engaging in 
cooperation AND in arms length conflict and price struggle.   Indeed, producers in both 
countries are trying to construct forms of governance that enable them to continue to innovate 
and improve their products at the same time that they help them cope with the pressures 
generated by sustained contingent collaboration.  
 
Second, we also reject the related, but not identical, institutionalist claim that national 
institutional systems change in path dependent ways: i.e., in the absence of a significant 
exogenous shock such as a war or terrible economic catastrophe, the coherence of institutional 
complementarities within a national architecture of institutions encourage actors to seek 
solutions to governance problems that are compatible with (if not reinforcing of) existing 
arrangements and constrain them from adopting governance solutions that are 
“fundamentally” incompatible with those arrangements.17
 
 
In what follows (section 3.2), we will show that, at least in the case of the relations emerging 
out of the vertical disintegration of manufacturing,  actors in both the United States and 
Germany are to a surprising extent neither significantly constrained nor especially enabled by 
the institutional architecture of the political economy.  Indeed, in many ways the institutional 
architectures  in both the US and Germany, as coherent systems, have been overtaken by 
events and stand awkwardly by as actors seek to construct new relations and forms of 
governance alongside them. This is not to say that there are no efforts to reform or adapt 
existing institutional arrangements to changing circumstances.  There are.18 Nor do we want 
to claim that actors are entirely ignorant of the normative dispositions constituting 
institutional rules. Far from it! In crucial ways we find that they are guided by these 
dispositions.19
 
  But we find both that actors act independently of institutional incentives and 
constraints AND that they try to use institutional mechanisms in new or un-standard ways in 
order to achieve their governance ends—that is, that they try to change the incentives and 
constraints that institutions provide to make them more suitable to the new context.    
Stated in a positive way, rather than looking, as institutionalists do, for structural constraints 
or enablers, we view the social terrain of the economy in the US and Germany as peopled by 
a community of reflexive agents, beset by common problems of their own definition (though 
not necessarily of their own making), seeking to construct solutions to the problems they 
encounter in practice.  And, rather than looking for institutional complementarities between 
system parts and greater and less “coherence” for the system as a whole, we conceive of the 
(very different) institutional architectures of the political economy in the US and Germany as 
constituting sets of resources for actors to use, not use, deconstruct or redefine in their efforts 
to contend with the problems of industrial transformation that beset them in practice.  In our 
view, institutions help actors solve governance problems.  If they do not solve (or even 
address) the problems that actors have, then institutions are either ignored or changed. 
 
At the end of the day, experimentation upon the social terrain of OEM supplier relations in 
both the United States and Germany is very widespread, and there are many different kinds of 
“solutions” to the governance problems posed by the new production relations being 
constructed.   In the conclusion, we suggest that this process of experimentation is slowly 
recomposing the institutional character of the political economies of both Germany and the 
United States in ways that nonetheless reproduce significant differences between the two 
political economies. 
 
3.1:  Sustained contingent collaboration in Germany and the United States. 
 
We constructed sustained contingent collaboration as a type in section two based on 
qualitative observation of supplier-OEM relations in both the US and Germany, so we are 
convinced that this type of relation can be found in both countries.  But there is no reason to 
take our word for it.  Indeed, there is a strong presumption within the VoC camp that relations 
in the US and Germany will systematically diverge, with German relations likely to be more 
cooperative and US relations likely to be more arms length and market defined.  Appeal to 
some neutral and broadly representative data would therefore seem to be in order. 
 
Numerous quantitative studies have been undertaken over the course of the last decade to 
determine the extent to which supply relations in manufacturing (particularly in the 
automobile industry) have become more collaborative and structured by the precepts of “lean 
manufacturing” (low inventory, low work in process, early supplier involvement in product 
design, team work,  transparency on costs between supplier and customer—etc). Happily for 
us,  most of the evidence is extremely contradictory.  Researchers find conflict and 
collaboration,  trust and distrust almost in equal measure in both societies. 
 
Sue Helper, for example, in studying supplier relations in the US automobile industry, has 
repeatedly found that many US suppliers are being asked to engage in product development, 
are being incorporated earlier into the product development process and have adopted a wide 
array of cost reducing and transparency enhancing arrangements in production. 20  In 
comparison to the conflictual and arms length practices of thirty and forty years ago in the 
US,  there is a remarkable amount of cooperation in contemporary US manufacturing.  But 
Helper also finds that US suppliers have a low level of trust in their customers. Many feel that 
their relationships with customers involve one way exchanges of know how.  Customers press 
supplier margins in the name of mutually beneficial cost reduction.  Customers solicit 
innovative design from their suppliers only to shop those designs around to supplier 
competitors.  And, OEM requests for just in time delivery are experienced as inventory 
shifting rather than inventory eliminating moves on the part of OEM.21
 
 
For Helper, the contradictory character of this evidence is viewed as a marker for the 
incompleteness of the transition to lean production in the US and above all as an indication of 
the legacy of arms length contracting in US manufacturing for much of the 20th century.22  
From the perspective on the VoC school, such contradictory data is evidence for the strength 
of the market tradition in the US and of the absence (or weakness) of institutions capable of 
sanctioning self dealing in non market relations.23  From our point of view, however, the 
contradictory impulses observed in Helper’s findings provide evidence for the kind of 
sustained contingent collaboration relations we believe are being systematically created in 
today’s competitive environment in spite of the institutional arrangements encouraging or 
discouraging particular forms of behavior in the society.24
 
  The challenge for producers in the 
US, we will see, is to create forms of governance that allow them to cope with the 
contradictory pressures being generated. 
Evidence is similarly contradictory in studies of German manufacturing supplier relations.  
One very extensive study, conducted by three major economic research institutes in Germany 
at the end of the 1990s of the automobile, electrical and mechanical engineering industries, 
found that German suppliers were indeed being asked to participate in product development at 
much earlier stages than they had been in the past.25   Forty one percent of automobile 
suppliers, 44.4% of electromechanical industry suppliers and 47.1% of mechanical 
engineering industry suppliers indicated that they were involved in intensive cooperation with 
other firms (though not all of these collaborative ties were with their direct customers).26 The 
survey also indicated that production cycle times were drastically declining across the supply 
base and that suppliers were adopting production level procedures (longer machine utilization 
rates, cross functional teams, ISO 9000 certification) to create greater cost transparency, 
improve quality and lower inventory.27
 
   
Yet, at the same time,  the survey also showed that over 91% of all surveyed firms in all 
surveyed industries ranked price pressure from OEMs as the greatest problem for suppliers; 
61.1% said that inconsistent delivery terms were a significant problem and 47.6% said that 
OEM’s were forcing them to hold inventory (rather than seeking to eliminate it from the 
supply chain).28 Of those firms engaged in collaborative research and development with their 
customers,  57% said that they were partially compensated (as opposed to fully compensated) 
for their efforts (nearly 50% of firms with fewer than 100 employees indicated that they 
typically received no compensation at all for their research contributions).29  In addition, the 
report notes that 42.9% of all German automobile suppliers complain of Customers shopping 
the supplier’s designs around to their competitors.30
 
 
As in the American case,  the evidence here is strikingly contradictory.  German suppliers are 
engaging in collaborative relations, but there is considerable conflict and struggle among the 
producers for the rents from the relationship and significant variety in the quality of relations.  
Seen with the institutionalist  lenses of the VoC framework, this kind of contradiction within a 
coordinated market economy is a sign of systemic distress.  The system of constraints and 
enablers is not functioning in a way that inhibits the diffusion of arms length market relations 
in Germany.  We agree that the constraints and enablers are not working in this way, though 
given the fact that there is considerable cooperation in the US where there are no institutional 
incentives for it, it is unclear to us that even the cooperation observable in German OEM 
supplier relations is in any significant way traceable to the “beneficial constraints” of the 
institutional architecture in the German coordinated market economy.31
 
  From our point of 
view, the evidence fits very well into the logic we have attempted to portray of sustained 
contingent collaboration. The challenge for German producers is to construct forms of 
governance that enable them to cope with the contradictory character of the current situation. 
Judging by the evidence presented, it seems fairly clear that both German and American 
manufacturing supplier relations today have strong elements of both conflict and partnership 
within them.  It is also clear that the institutional architectures in each of the political 
economies are not only achieving the outcomes they are thought to be able to produce; they 
are also allowing for the achievement of those that they are not supposed  to produce.    For 
us, this is a sign that in order to understand the character of practical, relational and 
institutional recomposition in Germany and the United States one should not start by 
observing the performance of institutions, but by looking concretely at the efforts of both 
suppliers and OEMs to cope with the contradictory character of their situation.   
    
 
3.2: Coping with the problem of sustained contingent collaboration in Germany and the 
US 
 
The situation that confronts both US and German suppliers and OEMs in the context of the 
trend toward vertical disintegration and the emergence of sustained contingent collaboration 
as the modal relationship between OEMs and suppliers is one of continuous change:  the 
character of relations, technology, specific workplace arrangements, skills, markets etc are 
continuously changing.   Actors (and regions) unable to cope with this kind of environment 
are unlikely to reproduce themselves.  In this context, there are two different governance 
problems for which actors in both societies have had to devise mechanisms to cope:  The 
problem of initial learning,  and the problem of cost reduction.   
 
 By initial learning, we refer to the processes by which producers acquire information and 
know how in order to be able to participate in the new style of relationship.  How do firms 
learn, for example,  about new style production arrangements (team work, cellular 
manufacturing, low work in process etc) and services (just in time delivery, sub assembly, 
logistics) that are needed to participate competitively in the new supply chains?  How are they 
able to develop the capacity to participate in collaborative design and product development?32
 
 
By cost reduction, we refer to the strategies and procedures suppliers and OEMs use to 
organize the generation of continuous cost reductions in production.  Analysis of both of these 
problem areas will reveal some commonalities but also significant differences in the way in 
which producers in the US and Germany cope with such demands. 
 
 
 
3.2.a Initial learning: 
 
Prior to the onset of the trend toward vertical disintegration in the 1980s, suppliers and 
OEM’s in both Germany and the US were primarily engaged in Type 1 style relations: i.e., 
short term, arms length relations in which suppliers either produced standardized commodity 
products or produced overflow capacity for OEMs during periods of peak demand.  On the 
whole, price was the determining factor for sales in old style manufacturing supply chains in 
the US and Germany.  OEMs were very vertically integrated and supplier structures in both 
countries tended to be divided between a relatively small number of large standard component 
producers, such as Robert Bosch or Borg Warner in the automobile industry and multitudes of 
small and medium sized contract shops engaged in capacity subcontracting.33
 
   
For the bulk of supplier firms in both economies, the trend of vertical disintegration and the 
shift toward sustained contingent collaboration has therefore involved significant pressures to 
upgrade their technological capabilities, production quality, service delivery capacities and 
internal cost management procedures.  This has pressed suppliers into large investments in 
new engineering personnel, to profound recomposition of their manpower usage and training 
practices, and to the reorganization of the work flow in production, forward to the customer 
and back to their own suppliers.  Mechanisms and methods facilitating this adjustment in both 
the United States and Germany have been parallel but systematically divergent.    
 
Initial Learning in the US34
 
 
Initially in the US,  OEMs  themselves invested significant direct effort and cost in the form 
of “supplier development”  to instruct their suppliers, one by one, in the new techniques.35
 
   
This, however, is a mechanism that has begun to disappear.  Supplier development was 
always accompanied and supplemented by consulting services that firms could acquire over 
the market, and these practices continue (though they are often too expensive for many 
smaller firms to make extensive use of).  Additionally, firms with the resources (and some 
without them) sought to acquire knowledge of the new techniques, and also new competences 
in technology and service, through the acquisition of complementary firms and/or rivals in the 
market.  The pressures placed on supplier firms by OEMs to enhance their development 
capabilities has led to significant mergers and organizational recomposition in the industry, at 
all levels, as actors have sought to create entities capable of efficiently participating in 
sustained contingent collaborations.  
The market is a traditional mechanism for resolving governance problems in the US, but it has 
not been the only one in play in the current adjustment period.  There has also been a very 
broad array of public and private and cooperative experiments attempting to upgrade the 
capabilities of the supply base in the areas of production quality, service provision and cost 
reduction. The experiments can be categorized as consortial, associational, and corporate.  In 
each case, public support may or may not play an important role. 
 
The Wisconsin Manufacturers Development Consortium (WMDC), described in detail by 
Whitford and Zeitlin is an example of a public-private consortium of large OEM firms, public 
agencies such as the Wisconsin Manufacturing Extension Partnership (WMEP) and technical 
colleges devoted to the improvement of the capacity of local component manufacturers to 
compete at the levels of production quality and cost reduction capability that the participating 
manufacturers require.36  Component supplier firms serving the members of the consortium 
have their participation subsidized by public money and they gain significant access to OEM 
know-how through participation in consortia-sponsored courses. 
 
  A similar program has been 
started in Pennsylvania, in the US. 
There are two different examples of associational leadership in the provision of service to 
firms seeking to learn how to square the circle of quality, service and low cost that is 
constitutive of sustained contingent collaboration.  The first is a program for supplier training 
directed by the Industrial Training  Program (ITP) in Illinois’s Department of Commerce and 
Community Affairs. 37 This program provides public funds to a variety of Illinois industry 
associations with membership structures composed primarily of small and medium-sized 
component manufacturers. In the case of the Valley Industrial Association (VIA) (in the outer 
western Suburbs of Chicago)38 or of Norbic (a membership based Industrial Development 
Association on the north side of Chicago serving primarily small and medium-sized 
producers), the ITP awards the associations funds and member firms make specific proposals 
to the association for training subsidies.  Fifty per cent of the expense of training is paid for 
by the program.  VIA encourages members to make use of the funds (which they do in large 
numbers), but does not give advice or assistance as to the types of training that may be 
necessary.  Norbic provides consulting services to its members to help them optimize the kind 
of training they utilize and then provides grants to firms for the training.39
 
 
The final variant of governance mechanisms capable of balancing manufacturing quality with 
continuous cost reduction is a corporate one.  Here there are two different kinds of 
mechanisms: one directed by internal corporate consulting units on operating units that are 
active as component suppliers; the other directed by OEM firms toward their component 
suppliers.   
 
The first mechanism can be found among large component and complex subassembly 
producers such as Emerson Electric, Danaher, GKN, and more specialized component 
producers such as ITW.  These firms operate their own internal organizational consultancies, 
often through their corporate “Technology Centers”.  Firms such as Danaher are widely 
known for their uniformly “lean” production operations and they are able to achieve this 
across a broad array of operating units and subsidiaries through the use of corporate training 
programs for operating unit engineers, managers and workers (often run through their 
corporate university) and technical consultants who benchmark subsidiaries within the 
conglomerate and disseminate information on successful organizational forms.  These 
corporate institutions broker solutions for independent operating units, bringing knowledge 
and expertise to a local production level which those local units would not have been able to 
marshal on their own.40
 
 
The second mechanism is in many ways a variant on the now increasingly discontinued 
practice of supplier development, although here the aim is to provide training to groups of 
suppliers to enable them to reorganize rather than to directly reorganize individual  suppliers.  
Moreover, in the most prominent case, this corporate policy is undertaken with local 
government subsidy.  The same Illinois ITP program mentioned in the discussion of 
associational initiatives above also makes supplier training money available directly to the 
three largest Illinois manufacturing  OEMs—Caterpillar, John Deere and the Ford Motor 
Company (which operates a massive assembly complex on the south side of Chicago).  These 
firms are charged with using the money to train suppliers that they identify as needing  
production quality assistance and improved cost reduction capability.  In these cases, the large 
OEM designs the curriculum and offers training that it believes will enable suppliers to 
consistently achieve quality and cost reduction targets that the firm establishes.41
 
  In effect, 
the state of Illinois outsources regional industrial policy to the major actors and shapers of 
industrial practice in the state.  The effect, however, is to insure that small and medium sized 
component suppliers cross the initial learning threshold for participation in the new style 
subcontracting relations. 
In sum, the governance of initial learning on the American side is characterized by processes 
of merger and firm recomposition guided by the market as well as by an array of non market 
experiments: associational, consortial,  and corporate.  Some of the mechanisms that have 
been set up (in particular the state sponsored corporate programs in Illinois) have the 
traditional character of firm led or arms length incentive creating industrial policy for which 
the US has long been known.  But others are more path breaking: the consortial and 
associational programs in Wisconsin, Illinois and Pennsylvania and some of the intra-
corporate consulting agencies are interesting because they are deliberative.  They involve 
systematic contact for information and experience exchange among the principle parties 
(OEM, Supplier, Association, State agency) in both the conception and execution of policy.  
The difficulty that all struggle with is how to accommodate local initiative and adaptability to 
central benchmarking and direction. 
 
Initial learning in Germany 
 
As in the US,  efforts to help producers to develop the capability to participate in the new 
subcontracting arrangements have been quite varied in Germany.  Different mechanisms have 
been in play (market, corporate, and associational) and the use and impact of the different 
mechanisms has been different in different regions.  In some ways, the mechanisms observed 
are quite consistent with the kind of governance that traditionally has existed in industrial 
Germany, but in other ways the current experiments mark a clear departure from the path.  
 
One traditional mechanism (often underplayed in discussions of Germany) has been the 
market.  Private consultancies, for example, have been very important vehicles for the 
diffusion of knowledge about the new production and supply relations in Germany.42
 
   
Mergers have also been very prominent in the component supplier market, again at all levels.  
In Baden Württemberg alone, the largest region of automobile component production in the 
country,  the number of prominent first tier suppliers to OEMs has been consolidated from 
somewhere between 25 or 30 players to less than 10 over the course of the last decade.  
Plainly, in both the US and in Germany, many firms have found it easier to acquire new 
capabilities by merging with actors who possess them (particularly in the technology and 
development area) than they have to develop them from scratch in house. 
There have been other efforts, however,  involving the cooperation of state, associational, 
firm and educational entities, that resemble the kinds of governance arrangement that is 
extensively discussed regarding the German case in the varieties of capitalism literature.  For 
example, beginning in the mid 1990s,  a series of Länder government “supplier initiatives” 
were created in the automobile industry (after strong lobbying by component industry 
associations) which brought together large automobile firms, their suppliers and local 
technical universities into a informational network.  For several years, these initiatives 
sponsored regular events in which details about the new production arrangements and supplier 
relations were extensively discussed.   Stronger and more enthusiastically attended in some 
regions than others43, such initiatives made information available to those suppliers interested 
in receiving it.  In  large part such efforts stopped at the boundary of the supplier firm, but 
they facilitated consulting business for the local technical university experts among member 
firms in the Initiative.  Finally, the traditional German system of co-determination has also 
played an effective role in helping to diffuse the workplace and production arrangements of 
“lean production” (in particular team work, continuous improvement procedures and cellular 
production) though the issuance of central guidelines for the adoption of the various elements 
of lean manufacture.44
 
 
Such reactions to the challenge of the new supplier-OEM arrangements constitute a kind of 
systemic reflex: The German institutional architecture doing what it can to help producers 
adjust to a new set of conditions.  Such reflexes have been significant, but in crucial ways 
they have not always been enough for producers.  The supplier initiatives had very uneven 
coverage (in many ways their success depended on the interest of the local OEM).  
Concretely, they facilitated information exchange and created networks for consultants, but 
this was often either too little information or too expensive (or both) for many firms to benefit 
from.  The industrial relations system had success with problems related to work organization 
and production flow within firms, but it was crucially inattentive to the elements of the new 
system that involved inter-firm relations—logistics, services, cooperation in design and 
product development.  As a result, many German supplier firms felt left in the cold by the 
traditional institutional architecture.  This opened up a space for very interesting experiments 
in governance that depart quite dramatically from the German norm. 
 
One remarkable experiment of this kind has been taking place in the Bergisches Land in 
Nordrhein Westfalen.  This region  is the second largest center of automobile components 
production in the Germany and  the largest concentration of small and medium-sized 
component producers in that sector. For traditional reasons, public policy for suppliers has 
been very  underdeveloped in the Bergisches Land.45
 
   Local banks are overwhelmed and cash 
poor; larger banks are pulling away from the industrial Mittelstand (SMEs);  employers’ 
associations are traditionally fractionalized and as a result passive.   In this case, the 
institutions of German coordinated capitalism are truly in disarray. 
 As a result, and somewhat ironically,  it has been the local IG Metall union, the strongest 
extra-firm institution in the region, that has stepped into the breach and begun pushing firms 
to upgrade and embrace not only newer forms of work and production organization, but new 
production services and logistics as well.  IG Metall’s  involvement in restructuring takes 
place in one of two ways.46
 
  First, in a significant array of cases, agents from the trade union 
district office in Wuppertal  act directly as consultants, offering firms advice on how to 
restructure their product palette, their labor and production arrangements,  and their finances 
in order to be able to achieve the quality and cost targets demanded by large automobile 
industry OEMs.   Second, and more often, the union acts as an intermediary  between the firm 
and consultants who come in, audit the company and provide advice and consulting on  how 
to restructure the firm to be competitive. 
Typically the union becomes involved (in either of the above ways) because it is asked to do 
so, first by the works council in a troubled firm (either in bankruptcy or in financial trouble) 
and then by the management itself.  The union establishes a set of conditions with the firm on 
restructuring—i.e., they will help with connections and line up consultants as long as the firm 
agrees to certain parameters (in the interest of IG Metall members) in the restructuring 
process.  With agreement, the union then goes ahead and lines up the consultant.  There are a 
number of very skilled local consultants who have had success in local restructuring. They 
know the firms, know the regional culture, know the industry etc.  But the union also uses its 
position to pressure the works council (to the extent it is resistant) to adopt practices in the 
long-term interest of the competitiveness of the firm (cells, teams, continuous monitoring, 
benchmarking of best practices in the industry, etc.). 
 
In these ways, IG Metall is playing a pivotal role in the management of small and medium-
sized firm adjustment in the region.  The union is simultaneously a broker and a conveyor of 
specialized knowledge.  IG Metall mediates consultants who help troubled firms restructure; 
it establishes guidelines for the general restructuring process with the firm before the 
consultants are deployed;  it engages itself in the internal restructuring discussion and is 
typically given access to the firms’ books.  Moreover, due to the structure of the German 
Federal Works Constitution Act,  the union is in a remarkably good position to be able to 
evaluate the performance of the various actors it engages and sets into action in  the 
restructuring process.   Union officials from the local district office sit on the supervisory 
boards  of important mega-suppliers (core customers of local SME firms) and are hence privy 
to very intimate info on the mega-supplier’s practices and strategies—world wide.  IG Metall 
knows what the customers of local firms want and is in a position to helpfully convey that 
information to its clients and critically evaluate management suggestions and the performance 
of consultants. 
 
It is important to emphasize that this kind of intervention constitutes a dramatic departure 
from traditional practice for IG Metall.  It is improvisation in the context of a failure of the 
traditional system to provide for area firms.  In once sense,  the union’s actions have a very 
traditional interest: to protect jobs in the region by enhancing the competitiveness of the firms 
that are located there.  But in order to achieve this goal the union has had to break from the 
traditional confines of union activity within the German system.   In effect they are 
constructing a system of “co-management” within local firms where the trade union and 
works council deliberate on strategic questions regarding the firm’s future and its customer 
relations that go well beyond the relatively circumscribed work place and labor market arenas 
demarcated in the system of codetermination and works constitution statutes in German law.  
At the same time, they are acting as a regional benchmarking agent, distributing information 
regarding best practice among area firms and even using information about international best 
practice that they are able to access through other roles they play in the system of 
codetermination (i.e. sitting on boards of multinational corporations headquartered in the 
region). 
 
This example for how the process of initial learning is being organized in Wuppertal is 
dramatic, but there are myriad other forms of departure and innovation occurring across the 
German industrial landscape as firms and associations seek to cope with the limits of the 
existing institutional architecture.  As in the US then, the problem of initial learning in 
Germany is being confronted in ways that both conform with and depart from the traditional 
path.   Crucially, the departures from path in each case do not converge.  Although they 
perform some of the same services and functions, for example, the Wisconsin supplier 
consortium and the Wuppertal experiment in Union led restructuring constitute quite distinct 
and different institutional efforts to cope with initial learning.  
 
 
 
 
3.2.b Coping with Cost Reduction Pressures: 
 
Cost reduction pressure in the current environment stems from the permanent pressure that 
producers feel to be technologically innovative.  Firms must allocate increasing amounts of 
resources to research and development—and moreover, in areas that are not always part of the 
traditional strengths of the business (e.g.: plastics or electronics for automobile producers).  In 
order to be able to do this, they must withdraw resources from other areas—hence the trend 
toward outsourcing and a focus on core competences.  But in addition to these measures, the 
pressure to remain innovative imposes permanent pressure on in house operations and on 
suppliers to continually reduce costs.  As we indicated in our discussion of the sustained 
contingent collaboration relation,  a firm’s facility in cost reduction is a major competitive 
advantage for it in dynamically changing relations. 
 
Being able to cope with this continuous pressure is a crucial governance issue in 
manufacturing today.  Firms must develop the in house procedures to be able to continuously 
generate and identify cost reduction possibilities.  Producers in both the United States and 
Germany, in different ways, have made interesting and significant strides in this direction. 
 
Internal Governance of Cost Reduction Processes in the US and Germany 
 
The overarching challenge in achieving continuous cost reduction is to  create organization 
that encourages all actors in the product design, development and manufacturing processes to 
reveal to others what they know about their area of preoccupation.  Such organizational 
transparency facilitates the identification of inefficiencies within functions as well as 
possibilities for improvement in the interfaces between functions.  Actors have to abandon the 
opportunistic impulse to protect information for local advantage and recognize that 
transparency is in the interest of everyone in the process. 
There are layers of mechanisms for the realization of this kind of voluntary transparency.   
 
At the level of work and production organization,  the core arrangements of lean production 
(teams, production cells, kaizen practices)  make continuous improvement one of their 
objectives.  Typically these arrangements encourage actors to reveal to one another what they 
know by grouping all relevant functions in the creation and production of a product together 
in a governance structure that directs its production—hence the outcome/reward for each 
function is dependent on the outcome/reward for all the others.  All recognize their common 
stake in the successful delivery and continuous improvement of the product.  Such 
arrangements seem to have diffused quite broadly in both the US and Germany at this point,  
though the transformation continues to be incomplete and the emphases in each political 
economy differ slightly.47
 
    
Cost reduction is also a key component of the search process that all producers in the 
sustained contingent collaboration relationship engage in.  Firms scan the terrain, both 
through collaborative benchmarking procedures in the product development process and 
through serial contracting with specialists, not only for technological know how, but also for 
organizational innovation and cost reduction expertise.  And, as the discussion in the previous 
section makes clear, practices in the US and Germany are remarkably convergent. 
 
Both of these layers of cost reduction practice are limited, however, in that they tend to be 
focused on particular projects or parts of the production process and as a result lack a sense of 
the overarching situation of multiple projects and multiple production processes in the 
enterprise as a whole.  But it is precisely at this level that much of the “waltz” of cost 
reduction takes place between firms in sustained contingent collaborations. Consequently, 
firms have had to develop internal mechanisms  which encourage product dedicated teams to 
reveal to super-ordinate  internal scanning  actors what they know.  This makes it possible for 
the scanners both to identify cost reduction possibilities throughout the firm (including 
projects whose profitability can be sacrificed to achieve a customers cost reduction demand in 
the interest of the extension and development of other very profitable projects) and to help 
diffuse innovations and practices that product-dedicated teams may be developing.  At this 
level of internal scanning, American and German firms have some similarities, but on the 
whole they have been developing different sorts of mechanisms. 
 
The similarities can be found in the smallest firms.  Here in both countries the super-ordinate 
monitoring role is frequently assumed by the principle owner of the firm.  In both countries, 
the effectiveness of this role depends very much on the local balance of power: If the owner 
acts autocratically, based on what she can observe rather than on what is revealed to her by 
the various product cells,  cost reduction is often a battle over givebacks and wages between 
production workers and management.   This kind of arrangement is less successful, in large 
part because the top down structure of governance does not encourage actors in production to 
truthfully reveal what they know.  If, on the other hand,  the owner  facilitates exchange 
between the various parts of his firm and engages in regularized consultation with shop floor 
personnel—team leaders, project coordinators, etc  -- the results are better.  Cost reduction is 
most successful when it becomes a process of collective self examination across roles and 
lines of authority in the firm.   
 
An alternative mechanism, found in small firms we visited in both the US and Germany, 
involves the creation of actors with roles in the firm that systematically cross functions and 
stages in the production process.  In one small family owned machine component producer 
we interviewed in Germany, for example, the owner described their internal deliberation 
procedures, in which works councilors and production workers met regularly with 
management and ownership, as designed to “systematically produce surprises” about plant 
layout, machine operation, work organization, material flow as well as possibilities for new 
products.  The key to the success of this was the existence of tool makers and set up personnel 
who were allowed (expected) to float  back and forth between design engineering and 
machine operators and across product lines.  Similarly, one small US deep draw stamping 
firm in western Michigan that we interviewed organized cost reduction scanning through the 
construction of dramatically expansive job descriptions for skilled tool makers in their shop.  
These skilled workers shepherded projects from beginning design to end manufacture and met 
regularly with one another as well as plant management and machine operators to discuss 
progress.   In both the German and US cases, the key to success was that management and 
work teams both identified their success with the improvement of the product and the cost 
reduction process.  Skilled workers who were intimately involved at all stages of the 
production process act as key integrating figures between the shop floor and firm 
management. 
 
In larger firms, however, the formation of a super-ordinate internal scanning practice differs 
between US and German firms.  In the US, two sorts of scanning practices predominate.  One 
is an autocratic role for finance departments  in internal deliberations about cost.  Because 
public US firms are required to make costs more transparent to the outside, finance people are 
able to use the force of accounting and share holder value arguments to impose particular 
decisions on multiple projects.  The criterion used is purely financial without consideration 
for the location strategically of particular projects in the historical relationship between the 
firm and its customer. In this case, the powerful role of finance departments is very much in 
line with what one would expect from the institutional structure of the US  “liberal market 
economy”.   
 
A second mechanism, often conceived of as a counterweight to the force of finance 
departments, has been to establish ongoing inter- and intra- operating unit cost reduction 
conversations among the relevant actors in the production process.  Such conversations 
(organized in the form of weekly meetings or teleconferences between project teams --often 
including key sub-suppliers)  bring together all those responsible for contracts with particular 
clients to exchange information and discuss collective possibilities for meeting the client’s 
targets.  The parties all have an interest in coming up with something to satisfy the client—
each recognizes that future business with the client may depend on it.  Such meetings tend 
both to identify best practice within the firm (through self reporting),  and create a forum in 
which the generalization of such practice can be discussed.   
 
Rather than by hierarchical direction or financial leverage,  such mechanisms turn mutual 
learning and information exchange to the competitive advantage of the firm as a whole.  It is 
in many cases true that the genesis of these institutionalized conversations has occurred 
because of the unrelenting internal pressure of finance departments in American corporations:  
The institutional goal of the cross project and cross functional conversations is to achieve (or 
beat) the goals established by finance, but in ways that are consistent with the health of both 
internal and customer relations as well as long term efficiency of production within the 
enterprise.  Regardless of how they are generated, the key to their success is the representation 
of all stakeholders in the products going to a particular client are incorporated in the 
conversation. Needless to say, this  kind of mutual monitoring and sharing of information, as 
a form of organization, marks an interesting departure from the “liberal market” practices 
associated with VoC characterizations of the American production system.  
 
In the German case, the institutional form of the super-ordinate scanner is different  because 
the basic institutional contour of the firm is different  than in the US.  Many large firms, for 
example, do not have the same kind of external pressure from finance markets that embolden 
(and strengthen) the hand of the finance department in US corporations.  Engineering and 
production are far stronger within German corporations than in American ones.  But cost 
reduction pressure, for the reasons given above, is just as intense in Germany, so firms have 
had to develop alternative mechanisms to identify  firm wide cost reduction possibilities.  
Three different kinds of experiments in this regard suggest the flavor and range of 
organizational recomposition that is taking place. 
 
The first, currently being developed at a large first tier automobile supplier resembles in some 
ways the internal consulting groups in American corporations that have played such an 
important role in initial learning.  This is a cross functional team charged with what the firm 
calls Leistungsorientiertes Management (Performance Oriented Management) whose charge 
is to monitor operations across the firm seeking efficiencies and cost reduction possibilities 
that may be neglected by the structure of team projects: e.g.: material purchases that could be 
combined, common design possibilities,  complementary machine usage rates, etc.  These 
teams are given general cost reduction targets, but  they can only achieve them in consultation 
with project and production teams.  In turn, the production teams, who experience direct 
pressure from their customers for specific give back percentages, view the performance 
oriented team as a resource. 
 
The second and third mechanisms seek to achieve the kind of continuous conversation among 
stakeholders described above in the American context.  But the conversations are realized via 
different institutional actors and catalyzing agents.  The second mechanism being deployed by 
many German firms  is to redraw the role of logistics departments in extremely expansive 
ways, such that agents from that department concern themselves with all organizational and 
product development issues within and across projects.  Logistics teams engage with all 
existing product development and production teams, at all stages of the development and 
production process, in an effort to generate and diffuse continuous cost reduction throughout 
the product development and production cycle.  The logistics departments also concentrate, in 
conjunction with purchasing, finance and development departments, in achieving the 
flexibility to balance varying intensities of cost reduction pressure across all projects within 
the firm.  In these ways,  logistics players have their incentives aligned both with the teams 
associated with specific projects and with the general cost reduction targets associated with 
the department as a whole within the enterprise. 
 
A third kind of experiment, at once the most remarkably German but also perhaps the most at 
odds with the traditional institutional structure of the German production system, involves the 
systematic involvement of works councils, in collaboration with plant management, to scan 
for cost reduction potential.  In the case of one large supplier to the mechanical engineering 
industry,  in which the IG Metall is very strongly represented (over 90% workforce 
organization, including management),  the works council pursues an extremely expansive 
version of German co-management.   Instead of confining their activities to the narrow tasks 
of workplace training, wages, scheduling and arbitration,  this works council contributes 
detailed proposals for work, production and product design reorganization to plant 
management (in most cases themselves IG Metall members). 
 
Initially, the works council became involved in the presentation of proposals for 
reorganization in an effort to present management with alternatives to proposals developed by 
outside management consultants.  With time, however, as it became clear that pressure for 
cost reduction was unremitting, the works council devoted an increasing share of its resources 
to the problem (devoting two full time members of the works council exclusively to the 
problem of cost reduction).  It has gone so far that the works council has become involved not 
only in the optimization of organization in the servicing of existing contracts. They have also 
become actively involved in the way in which the company constructs its bids on new 
contracts.  These activities are in line with the general role of German works councils—to 
make the employment of its members secure.  But it pursues this goal in a very 
unconventional manner—involving itself with engineering and controlling departments in 
addition to production level management in an effort to achieve internal efficiencies that 
allow the firm to meet existing cost reduction targets and to win new contracts. 
 
As in the case of the new style logistics departments (and in some was, the newly defined 
boundary spanning tool makers in the small firm examples), the advantage of the works 
council in the process is that it is, as an actor, both part of the local level in the plant and 
involved in superordinate scanning.  Local players are willing to reveal what they know 
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of their area because they know that the works 
council has no incentive to punish them with that information.  The result is greater 
transparency regarding cost throughout the firm. 
 
As we have indicated, in many of these German and American examples  there are clear  
departures from the traditional path.  There are no constraints or enabling rules in the 
institutional system in the US to create cost reduction conversations or boundary crossing 
toolmakers; nor are the new style logistics departments or cost reduction oriented works 
councils enacting a logic prescribed by the German institutional architecture.  In all these 
cases, actors are innovating despite the rules of the game.  The institutional arrangements are 
not so much constraints or enablers as they are resources in the creative process of 
experimentation.    
 
Finally, although we believe  these examples constitute departures from the path, we also 
believe strongly that they should be viewed as experiments.  We do not intend to suggest that 
the above illustrations constitute the emergence of a new “system” in either institutional 
setting.   Rather, by outlining an array of experiments, we  want to  convey the breadth of 
current experimentation that exists at a local level.  We see institutional adaptation through 
the recomposition of organizational design or the redefinition of roles.  Many of the 
experiments involve departures either from the traditional roles of actors within the 
institutional architecture of the German and American production systems or from the 
organizational ecology established by those architectures.  All the experiments draw on 
existing resources, but apply them in new and creative ways.   
 
 
 
Conclusion.    
 
In conclusion, we would like to review and underscore three points about the argument and 
evidence in this paper.  First, we have argued that the process of vertical disintegration and 
the emergence of sustained contingent collaboration is a global trend.  It is occurring in 
similar ways across different political economies.  But unlike neo-liberal arguments, ours is 
not a claim about the diffusion of a single standard of efficiency throughout the global 
economy.  We are not making a “one best way” argument about institutional convergence.  
Instead, our argument, embodied in the characterization of OEM behavior in section 1 and the 
typology we develop in section 2, is that there is great heterogeneity of practice in the current 
global manufacturing environment.  OEMs pursue a wide array of practices and strategies 
even as their commitments to vertical disintegration intensifies.  In our view, sustained 
contingent collaboration as a type of relation between OEM and supplier is emerging across 
advanced industrial societies as the modal relation, but it remains only one possibility among 
several others.  Finally, we show that even our modal relation, sustained contingent 
collaboration, is emerging under a broad array of different governance mechanisms in both 
Germany and the United States.  Vertical disintegration and the emergence of sustained 
contingent collaborations are global trends. But this is not  in any register evidence for the 
veracity of neoliberal claims regarding the economic processes of globalization. 
 
Second, this paper has been an extended reflection on the limits of contemporary institutional 
analysis, particularly that of the Varieties of Capitalism school, in accounting for the 
differences that continue to exist in developed political economies.  In insisting on the 
difference between our argument and the strong convergence claims of contemporary 
neoliberalism, we are in agreement with much institutionalist writing on the persistence of 
differences across advanced political economies in the context of contemporary trends. But, in 
our view, contemporary institutionalism of the VoC variety goes too far in its emphasis on 
comparative institutional advantage and the path dependent character of systemic change.  In 
a way that is inconsistent with the VoC characterization of the national institutional 
advantages in the US and Germany, we have shown that sustained contingent collaborations 
are emerging in both societies.  Germany does not have a greater preponderance of nor 
display any particular advantage in cooperative practices.  US firms are neither more invested 
in arms-length contracting nor more capable of radical organizational recomposition than 
their German counterparts.  Instead,  conflict and cooperation and institutional recomposition 
and experimentation characterize actors’s strategies in both societies. 
 
Similarly, regarding institutionalist claims about path dependence, our evidence shows that 
with the diffusion of sustained contingent collaboration, actor’s efforts to cope with pressures 
for adjustment are producing a variety of significant departures from the path of action 
generally thought to be encouraged by either the US or German institutional architectures. 
The cooperative deliberation within large US firms regarding cost reduction and the 
collaborative supplier training consortia in the US and Union led restructuring and works 
council-driven cost reduction in Germany all are significant departures from the path.  In 
some cases, actors are guided by traditional conceptions of their institutional roles, yet find it 
to be necessary to act in unconventional ways to be able to realize those goals (e.g. the IG 
Metall in Wuppertal or  works councils engaging in systematic scanning for cost reduction).  
But in other cases, actors  respond to challenges posed by the competitive environment in 
ways that appear to be neither systematically constrained nor encouraged by the institutional 
architecture in which they are embedded.  That is,  actors respond creatively to  their situation 
(e.g.: the expansive role for logistics departments in Germany or the  expansive cross 
functional role of tool makers within US and German small firms).    
 
All of this evidence, in our view,  underscores the reflexive character of action within a social 
economy.  Actors are not confined within a rigid institutional system of constraints and 
incentives, but instead exist within a social system of contingently coupled dispositions and 
habits48
 
.  They solve problems through collective self-reflection and experimentation using 
and recomposing the resources (institutional and otherwise) that they have on hand. The 
result, as we have shown,  is not only that actors appear at times to be oblivious to the 
constraints or incentives provided by their institutional surround.  They also recreate 
institutional difference across political economies as actors creatively recompose and even 
break from the framework for practice that their institutional context provides. 
The third and final point we would like to underscore here concerns the experimental and 
ultimately piecemeal character of change in both the German and US political economies.  
None of the examples of institutional innovation and recomposition outlined in the second 
half of the paper in the areas of initial learning and cost reduction constitute a dominant form 
of adjustment within either the US or Germany.  Adjustment in both societies is extremely 
fractured and driven by local experimentation.  It is not for this reason to be taken less 
seriously.  Instead, we believe that the transformation of institutional architectures within 
contemporary advanced political economies is occurring in precisely this sort of 
decentralized, local and piecemeal fashion.  Giants are felled by thousands of arrows. 
 
We put to the side the question of whether or not this is a general matter regarding the nature 
of institutional transformation in all times and all places.   But the current character of global 
competition, characterized as it is by virtually permanent technological change and 
organizational uncertainty, leads to the following boundedly general consideration.  Much of 
the literature on institutional systems, not least the VoC tradition, discusses the historical 
development of institutional architectures in the imagery of periods of stability marked by 
dramatic junctures of upheaval and change followed again by a period of stability.   One can 
be critical of this historical imagery as a general matter49, but it seems particularly 
inappropriate to impose narrative expectations of a coming period of institutional stability 
(equilibrium) on the current situation.  In large part this is because  what stands out about the 
experiments that one observes today  is their self consciously provisional character.  They 
have been brought into being because actors perceive common problems that are not being 
addressed by the traditional institutional instruments available to them for the purpose of 
addressing such problems.  Actors are not willing to describe what they are doing as a new 
order because they are too acutely aware of the possibility that they will have to change again 
in the current turbulent environment. The distinctiveness of current problems is that they are 
never definitively resolved:  Innovation and Cost reduction, and the institutional tinkering and 
recomposition that they entail are continuous processes.  Old institutional rules today are not 
only being broken, but new ones are continually being defined and then redefined. 
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